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0000O0000 
SALT LAKE CITY, : 
: APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
V. : 
: Case No. 950290-CA 
CAROL S. GARCIA, : 
Priority No. 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
0000O0000 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the court pursuant to Rule 
26(2) (a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3 (2) (d) (1995), whereby a defendant in a circuit court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the court of appeals from a 
final order on a misdemeanor offense. In this case the Honorable 
T. Patrick Casey, Judge Pro Tern, Third Circuit Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and 
conviction for the offenses of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code 
§ 12.24.100 (1995). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The relevant portion of the DUI statute under which Ms. Garcia 
was convicted is reproduced here: 
12.24.100 Driving under the influence of drugs and 
intoxicants prohibited--Penalties. 
A. It is unlawful and punishable as provided in this 
section for any person to operate or be in actual physical 
control of a vehicle within this city if the person has a 
blood or breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater by 
weight as shown by a chemical test given within two hours 
after the alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any drug, or the 
combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
renders the person incapable of safely driving a vehicle 
within the city. The fact that a person charged with 
violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use 
alcohol or a drug does not constitute a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
Salt Lake Code § 12.24.100(A) (1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. IS THE HORIZONTAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS (HGN) TEST SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE THAT MUST MEET THE INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD 
ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT? 
II. DID THE COURT ERR BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN 
TEST WITHOUT REQUIRING THE CITY TO PRESENT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE TEST? 
III. WAS THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN TEST RESULT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR REQUIRING REVERSAL? 
These issues were preserved below. See Trial Transcript pp. 
13-37, 53 (text of pretrial motion hearing and citation to 
defendant's objection during trial). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the admissibility of a scientific test a 
reviewing court must determine if the evidence presented at trial 
showed that the scientific principles and testing techniques meet 
the Utah standard of inherent reliability, and whether the 
2 
scientific principles or techniques were properly applied to the 
facts of the particular case by qualified persons. State v. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397, 398 n.7. (Utah 1989). 
An appellate court reviews the denial of a defendant's motion 
to suppress in a bifurcated manner, reviewing the trial court's 
subsidiary and factual determinations under clearly erroneous 
standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-39 (Utah 1994). On appeal, this 
court should review the trial court's determination that the 
evidence presented was insufficient to establish the reliability of 
the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test under a clearly erroneous 
standard. The question of whether HGN evidence is scientific 
evidence should be addressed under a correction of error standard. 
Whether the admission of the HGN evidence constitutes 
reversible error depends on whether the admission of the HGN 
evidence was sufficiently prejudicial that there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant in its 
absence. See State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 361 (Utah 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 20, 1995, a jury found Ms. Garcia guilty of two 
charges: (1) Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol (DUI) in 
violation of Salt Lake Code 12.24.100, and (2) Driving Without a 
License in violation of Salt Lake Code 12.24.010. Trial Transcript 
121 (hereafter "Tr."). Ms. Garcia was sentenced and judgment was 
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entered on March 27, 1995. On April 25, 1994, Ms. Garcia filed her 
Notice of Appeal of the DUI conviction only. 
Ms. Garcia appeals her conviction for Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol on the grounds that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by permitting the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) 
evidence to be presented without a foundation as to the reliability 
of the test and the scientific principles underlying the test. The 
issue of whether HGN evidence is scientific evidence is a question 
of first impression in Utah. 
FACTS 
1) On March 5, 1994 at about 8:25 p.m., Officer David Warner 
(Warner) observed a car driven by Carol Garcia heading westbound on 
5th South and then turning southbound on State Street. Warner 
followed the car until it stopped at a light at 6th South and there 
told Ms. Garcia to pull over. Ms. Garcia pulled over and stopped 
between 6th and 7th South. Tr. 45-46. Warner testified he saw no 
driving violations by Ms. Garcia, i.e., no wide turns, no weaving, 
no straddling lane lines, no following too closely, no drifting in 
her lane, nor was she slow to respond to traffic signals. Tr. 69-
73. 
2) Warner stated that he did observe two teenagers sitting 
on the sunroof of the car with their legs inside the car. Tr. 45. 
Based on that observation Ms. Garcia was initially charged with 
driving without a seatbelt; however, that charge was dismissed at 
the request of the assistant city prosecutor before trial. Tr. 1. 
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3) Warner initially noted that Ms. Garcia was pleasant and 
upbeat, and that she had normal (not slurred) speech. Tr. 49. 
Warner also noted that Ms. Garcia had red eyes but admitted that 
there are many causes of red eyes including allergy, fatigue, smoke 
and pollution. Tr. 75. 
4) Warner noted an odor of alcohol. Tr. 48. Ms. Garcia 
admitted drinking two beers earlier at a barbecue. Tr. 49. Officer 
Williams later found an open can of beer under Ms. Garcia's seat. 
Tr. 99. Warner admitted that an odor of alcohol is not proof of 
impairment and that even sober individuals who have just taken a 
drink can have an odor of alcohol on their breath. Tr. 73-74. 
5) Warner decided to administer some field sobriety tests. 
The first test Ms. Garcia was ordered to perform was the horizontal 
gaze nystagmus test (hereafter "HGN"). 
6) During the trial Ms. Garcia objected to any evidence 
about the HGN test being received without a prior foundation as to 
the inherent reliability of the test. Tr. 53. In addition, after 
the jury was selected but prior to the first witness, a hearing was 
held on defendant's motion to exclude HGN evidence. Tr. 13-37. 
Ms. Garcia argued that HGN evidence is scientific evidence that 
requires the prosecution to lay a foundation of inherent 
reliability as a prerequisite to admission. Ms Garcia argued that 
under Rimmasch, Kofford and Jackson, the prosecution must 
demonstrate: (1) that nystagmus of the eye is an inherently 
reliable indicator of an individual's blood alcohol level or 
ability to safely operate a motor vehicle; (2) that the 3-part HGN 
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test performed by Warner is an inherently reliable means of 
measuring nystagmus of the eye, (3) that Officer Warner properly 
performed the tests on this occasion, and (4) that Officer Warner 
was sufficiently qualified to testify as to the test's result. Tr. 
14. Ms. Garcia argued that this foundation goes to admissibility 
not merely to weight. Tr. 13. Ms. Garcia also argued that the 
burden is entirely on the prosecution to establish the foundation 
and that the defense was not required to establish that the 
proffered evidence was unreliable. Tr. 14. 
7) Warner stated he was first trained to do the HGN test in 
1988 as part of an intoxilyzer recertification course and has used 
it as much as 250 times per year since that time. Tr. 20-21. 
Warner testified that he could not say whether the Salt Lake Police 
Department has used the test continuously since that time. Tr. 20. 
8) In administering the HGN test, Warner stated he held a 
stimulus 12 to 15 inches in front of Ms. Garcia's eyes.1 He then 
moved the pen across Ms. Garcia's field of vision in about four 
seconds. Warner was looking for three things as he administered 
the HGN test: (1) the angle of onset of nystagmus2 in each eye, (2) 
lack of smooth pursuit, and (3) the presence of nystagmus at 
maximum deviation, (i.e., when the eye is moved as far as possible 
1
 In administering the HGN, Warner claims to have followed 
the procedures outlined by the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. No published verification of these procedures was 
placed in the record. 
2
 Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, 
which may be horizontal, vertical or rotary. State v. Witte, 836 
P.2d 1110, 1112 (Kan. 1992), citing Dorland's Illustrated Medical 
Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974). 
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to one side). Tr. 54-56. 
9) Warner noted that if the subject's head was not still the 
person administering the test could not validate the test. Tr. 27. 
Warner testified that Ms. Garcia did not keep her head still and 
that he did not use any sort of mechanical device to control her 
head movement, but that he keep doing the test until he was 
satisfied with the result. Tr. 27. 
10) When asked whether inaccurate estimation of the angles 
involved would lead to a false positive test result, he stated: 
"The test is no better than the person administering it." Tr. 26. 
Warner did not use a template or protractor to determine the angle 
of onset, he just estimated the angle. Tr. 26. He testified that 
using any sort of device to measure the angle of onset was "not 
something that's ever been recommended for field work." Tr. 87. 
11) Warner testified that he has never recorded and submitted 
any of his tests for publication or review. Tr. 23, 86. 
12) Warner testified that he has no personal knowledge of the 
biomechanical processes by which alcohol ingestion supposedly 
produces gaze nystagmus. Tr. 22-23. Warner has no degrees in 
medicine, opthamology, or neurology. Tr. 23. Warner acknowledged 
that nystagmus is caused by some illnesses and by substances other 
than alcohol and that some people in the population exhibit natural 
nystagmus. Tr. 24-25. 
13) . Warner testified that one study by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration found that, even when used in 
conjunction with the Walk and Turn test, the HGN test was wrong at 
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least 20% of the time. Tr. 86. 
14) Warner testified he did not know what the general opinion 
of the scientific community might be of the HGN test. Tr. 24. 
15) The trial judge took as stipulated the fact that Warner 
is not familiar enough with scientific literature or studies to 
discuss them professionally. Tr. 15, 16 LL 10-11. The judge found 
that Officer Warner could not provide the type of expert testimony 
required for the Frye test foundation. Tr. 35. 
16) The prosecutor suggested the judge could take judicial 
notice of the reliability of the HGN test on the basis of the 
underlying science. Tr. 34. Judge Casey concluded that there was 
no ba$is for taking judicial notice. Tr. 35. 
17) Nevertheless, the trial court denied Ms. Garcia's motion 
to exclude HGN evidence and allowed Warner to testify about the 
result of Ms Garcia's test based on his personal experience in 
administering the test. 
18) Warner testified that Ms. Garcia exhibited nystagmus in 
both eyes on all three components of the test: lack of smooth 
pursuit, distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation, and onset of 
nystagmus before 45 degrees. Tr. 54-57. Warner testified that 
this score indicated that Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol content was 
.10 or greater. Tr. 56; see also Tr. 21, 28. Ms. Garcia refused 
to take the breathalyzer test, so the HGN test result was the only 
evidence adduced at trial that Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol content 
exceeded the legal limit of .08. See Salt Lake Code § 12.24.100 
(reproduced supra). 
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19). The next test given was the "Walk and Turn" test. Tr. 
59. Ms. Garcia was asked to walk nine steps in a line, heel to 
toe, with her hands at her sides, to watch her feet while walking 
and count each step out loud, then to rotate and wake nine more 
steps heel to toe back. Tr. 60. Ms. Garcia complained of an ankle 
injury but attempted to complete the test as asked. Tr. 76. 
During the "instructional stage" the individual is asked to stand 
heel to toe. Warner stated that if they have a problem, i.e., if 
they lose balance a total of three times, this test is terminated. 
Tr. 59. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia stepped to the side only one 
time during the instructional phase. Tr. 59. Ms. Garcia correctly 
walked nine steps, stayed on a straight line, did not start too 
soon or stop to steady herself, was able to complete the test 
without using her arms to balance, and touched heel to toe on all 
but the 6th step. Tr. 76-80. Then she paused, turned and asked 
Warner to clarify the test directions. Tr. 80. Warner failed Ms. 
Garcia for not completing the test. Tr. 80. 
20) Warner then asked Ms. Garcia to perform the "finger 
count" test. Tr. 61. Warner provides subjects the following 
instructions: to touch the tip of each finger with their thumb, 
counting that finger out loud; to start with their little finger up 
to their index finger and back down, counting: one, two, three, 
four, four, three, two, one; and to complete this cycle three 
times. Warner stated he looks for actual touching of fingers and 
correct counting. Tr. 62-63. Ms. Garcia correctly touched her 
fingers tip to tip and performed the test the correct number of 
9 
times. Tr. 80. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia also counted 
correctly the first two times she did the test (i.e., 1234, 4321), 
but counted 1234, 4231 the third time. Warner admitted that other 
than that she performed the test correctly. Tr. 82. He said that 
the finger count is not a validated test. Tr. 82. He cautiously 
admitted that "I wouldn't describe her performance on that test as 
poor." Tr. 83. 
21) Then, Warner asked Ms. Garcia to perform the Romberg or 
"head tilt and count" test. Tr. 63. This test requires the 
subject to put their feet together and their arms down at their 
side, to close their eyes and tilt their head back, and estimate 
the passage of 3 0 seconds. Tr. 63. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia 
swayed from side to side (but apparently did not lose her balance) , 
and that she stopped the test after nine seconds. Tr. 63. 
22) At some point during the stop, Officer Roger Williams 
(Williams) arrived on the scene. Williams stated Ms. Garcia had 
bloodshot eyes and an odor of alcohol. Williams didn't recall 
observing any particular field sobriety tests performed by Warner; 
he stated that there was one test she couldn't do but didn't 
remember which one it was. Tr. 97. 
23) Williams performed a portable breath test on Ms. Garcia. 
Tr. 89. He testified that it showed that Ms. Garcia had consumed 
some alcohol. Tr. 89-90. Judge Casey instructed the jury that the 
mere consumption of alcohol prior to driving is not unlawful. The 
actual test result was not admitted into evidence because that test 
has not been recognized as reliable and accurate. Tr. 84. 
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24) After the last field sobriety test, Warner placed Ms. 
Garcia under arrest and asked her to submit to a chemical test. 
Tr. 84-85. Warner testified that when asked to submit to the test 
Ms. Garcia stated: "Another one? No I won't take another one." Tr. 
85. And when informed of the consequences of refusing the test 
(license suspension) Ms. Garcia responded: "What's the point. My 
license is suspended anyway." Tr. 90. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test is widely deemed to 
be based on scientific principles beyond the understanding of lay 
jurors. Utah law requires a foundation of the inherent reliability 
of scientific evidence as a prerequisite to its admission. The 
evidence introduced in the court below shows that the HGN testing 
procedure is fraught with fallibility. After a pretrial hearing, 
the judge found that the city was not able to establish through 
Officer Warner's testimony either that the HGN test is inherently 
reliable or that the test is generally accepted in the scientific 
community as reliable. 
The court's subsequent decision to allow the HGN evidence 
despite the lack of foundation was error. The HGN evidence 
presented created a misleading aura of certainty regarding the 
reliability and significance of the evidence. The error was 
prejudicial in this case because Warner's HGN testimony was the 
only testimony that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol content (BAC) 
over the legal limit. (Warner testified at trial that the HGN test 
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showed a BAC of .10 [grams by weight] or higher) . Without evidence 
that Ms. Garcia had a BAC over the legal limit of .08, the city 
would have had to prove she was incapable of safely operating a 
motor vehicle. The only evidence presented about Ms. Garcia's 
ability to operate her vehicle was that she did so correctly. 
Officer Warner noted no moving violations whatsoever. Moreover, 
the results of the other field sobriety tests were not particularly 
incriminating. Thus, absent the HGN testimony it is reasonably 
likely the jury could have reached a result more favorable to Ms. 
Garcia. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE HGN TEST IS SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE AND MUST MEET THE 
INHERENT RELIABILITY STANDARD ARTICULATED BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT. 
The majority of the jurisdictions considering the 
admissibility of horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test results have 
found the test to be based on scientific principles. The Utah 
Supreme Court has held that evidence based on scientific principles 
requires a foundation of the "inherent reliability" of the 
principles prior to admission. In this case the trial court found 
that the city failed to establish such a foundation. 
A. The HGN Test 
Nystagmus is one of several types of abnormal ocular movements 
defined as "an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may 
be horizontal, vertical, rotary, or mixed." State v. Witte, 836 
12 
P.2d 1110, 1112 (Kan. 1992) (quoting Dorland's Illustrated Medical 
Dictionary 1068 (25th ed. 1974)). The theory behind the gaze 
nystagmus test is that there is a correlation between the amount of 
alcohol a person consumes and the angle of onset of the nystagmus. 
Id. (citing Carper & McCamey, Gaze Nystagmus: Scientific Proof of 
DUI?, 77 111. B.J. 146, 147 (1988)). 
The Witte court outlined the procedures suggested by the 1984 
NHTSA Study for administering the HGN test. See National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, DOT-HS-806-512, Improved Sobriety 
Testing (January 1984) (found at 2 Nichols, Drinking/Driving 
Litigation § 26 app. A [1991]) (hereafter 1984 NHTSA Study). The 
officer should first ask the suspect to remove glasses or hard 
contact lenses. A suspect is then ordered to keep his head still 
and to follow the stimulus -- usually a pen, flashlight, or the 
officer's finger -- with his eyes only. The officer then moves the 
stimulus across the suspect's field of vision until the eye moves 
to the extreme side. The 1984 NHTSA Study recognizes that some 
suspects will move their heads; the officer is thus instructed to 
use a flashlight or his free hand for a chin rest. When conducting 
the HGN, the officer looks for three signs in each eye: (1) angle 
of onset occurring before 45 degrees in each eye; (2) ability of 
the eye to follow the moving object smoothly; and (3) the presence 
of moderate or distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation. If the 
officer finds four of the possible six clues, then he can 
purportedly classify the suspect's blood alcohol content BAC as 
above .10 percent. Witte, 836 P.2d at 1111-12, citing 1984 NHTSA 
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Study, at 3-4. This summary of the HGN test is similar to Officer 
Warner's description of the HGN test he administered to Ms. Garcia. 
See Summary of Relevant Facts, supra, 9-19. 
B. The HGN Test and its results are based on 
scientific principles 
The majority of the jurisdictions considering the 
admissibility of HGN test results have found the test to be based 
on scientific principles. State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116 
(Kan. 1992) ("The majority of jurisdictions that have considered 
the issue have held that the HGN test is scientific evidence") ; see 
also People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 332-33 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) 
(HGN test is a novel scientific technique that requires evidence of 
general acceptance in the scientific community); Ex Parte Malone, 
575 So. 2d 106, 107 (Ala. 1990) (admission of HGN without showing 
reliability of scientific principles upon which it is based 
rendered admission of test results reversible error); State v. 
Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 644-45 (W. Va. 1988) (error to admit HGN 
test without evidence of both the general acceptance of the 
reliability of the test and the scientific principles on which it 
is based); State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 856 (Mont. 1988) (HGN is 
scientific evidence); State v. Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 
1986) (holding it error to admit HGN test -like polygraph test - as 
scientific evidence without competent evidence that test is valid); 
State v. O'Kev, 1994 WL 413239, *6-7 (Ore. July 7, 1995) (HGN rests 
on scientific principles that, unlike other field sobriety tests, 
are not within the realm of common knowledge); State v. Superior 
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Court, 718 P.2d 171, 178 (Ariz. 1986) ("The HGN test is a different 
type of test from balancing or walking a straight line because it 
rests almost entirely upon an assertion of scientific legitimacy 
rather than a basis of common knowledge."); State v. Merritt, 647 
A.2d 1021, 1026, 1028 (Conn. App. 1994) ("in accord with the 
majority of jurisdictions ... we conclude that the HGN test and its 
results are based on a scientific principle"); State v. Cissne, 865 
P. 2d 564, 569 (Wash. App. 1994) (holding it was reversible error to 
admit HGN test results without foundational showing that test is 
reliable and meets Frye standard); State v. Hill, 865 S.W.2d 702, 
704 (Mo. App. 1993) (requiring expert testimony regarding general 
acceptance of HGN test in scientific community) ; Yell v. State, 856 
P.2d 996, 996-97 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (HGN is scientific 
evidence and requires proof that reliability of test has gained 
general acceptance; police officer's testimony falls far short of 
meeting standard); Foster v. State, 420 S.E.2d 78, 78 (Ga. App. 
1992) (HGN is scientific evidence requiring proof of general 
acceptance of reliability in scientific community); State v. 
Garrett, 811 P.2d 488, 490 (Id. 1991); Commonwealth v. Miller, 532 
A. 2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (HGN test requires expert 
testimony of general acceptance of its validity).3 
3
 A minority of states hold that HGN is not scientific 
evidence or apply standards for admissibility that are more liberal 
than Utah's: State v. Sullivan, 426 S.E.2d766 (S.C. 1993); State 
v. Bresson, 554 N.E.2d 1330 (Ohio 1990) (finding HGN different from 
other scientific tests such as Polygraph test because no special 
equipment required); State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Iowa 
1990) (Iowa adopts liberal approach to admissibility of technical 
information -- HGN test no more scientific than other field 
sobriety tests); State v. Clark, 762 P.2d 853, 856 (Mont. 1988) 
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C. The city failed to show that the HGN Test met 
the inherent reliability standard 
HGN evidence is scientific evidence that requires the 
prosecution to lay a foundation of inherent reliability as a 
prerequisite to admission. This foundation goes to admissibility, 
not merely to weight. State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 403 (Utah 
1989) (sexual abuse profile testimony not allowed absent proof of 
reliability of principles and techniques); Phillips v. Jackson, 615 
P. 2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (foundation required prior to admission of 
(applying a standard for admissibility described by the court as 
less restrictive than Frye); Whitson v. State, 863 S.W.2d 794 (Ark. 
1993) (holding HGN test not to be scientific but limiting testimony 
to showing that alcohol was consumed). 
Some courts have concluded that although HGN is scientific 
evidence, the reliability of the HGN test is widely accepted so no 
expert testimony is required: Emerson v. State, 880 S.W.2d 759 
(Tex. Cr. App. 1994) (appellate court took judicial notice of the 
reliability of both the theory underlying HGN tests and its 
technique); City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 706 (N.D. 
1994) (appellate court took judicial notice from materials 
submitted on appeal that the principles underlying the HGN test 
were "widely accepted" and therefore required no expert testimony); 
State v. O'Kev, 1994 WL 413239, *18 (Ore. July 7, 1995) (stating 
that the HGN test is no longer novel) . The better view of the 
novelty issue, however, is stated in People v. Leahy, 882 P. 2d 321, 
332 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (noting that although HGN testing has 
been in use for 3 0 years, "it has not been widely applied in the 
United States until recently," i.e. about 1984; the court also 
found that it would be "unjustified" "to hold that a scientific 
technique could become immune from . . . scrutiny merely by reason of 
long-standing and persistent use by law enforcement outside the 
laboratory or the courtroom"). 
Several courts have simply relied on the analysis of the 
Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Superior Court, 718 P. 2d 171 
(Ariz. 1986) (holding HGN to be scientific in nature but finding 
that the evidence presented to the trial court met the Frye 
standard); see, e.g. , State v. Garrett, 811 P.2d 488, 491 (Id. 
1991); People v. Buening, 592 N.E.2d 1222, 1227-28 (111. App. 
1992); State v. Armstrong, 561 So. 2d 883, 887 (La. App. 1990). It 
should be noted, however, that the Arizona case was an early case 
decided before many of the articles and cases criticizing the 
reliability of HGN testing were published. 
16 
paternity tests as to reliability of both human leucocyte antigen 
tests in general and of particular tests in each case) . The burden 
is entirely on the prosecution to establish the foundation. The 
defense is not obligated to prove the proffered evidence 
unreliable. The Utah Supreme Court stated, "The proponent of 
scientific evidence that does not qualify for judicial notice must 
make an initial foundational showing that convinces the trial court 
that the principles or techniques underlying the proffered 
testimony meet Phillips' standard of inherent reliability before 
the trial court can proceed to consider the normal foundational 
questions appropriate to any expert testimony." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
at 398 (emphasis added), citing Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1236, and 
Kof ford, 744 P. 2d at 1347. In the absence of such an initial 
showing, the evidence is to be excluded. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 
398. 
The Rimmasch court noted the danger of admitting unproven 
scientific principles: 
One danger being guarded against is the tendency of the 
finder of fact to abandon its responsibility to decide 
the critical issues and simply adopt the judgment of the 
expert despite an inability to accurately appraise the 
validity of the underlying science. 
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 396; see Merritt, 647 A.2d at 1028 (stating 
that the mechanics of the HGN test, unlike those of other field 
sobriety tests, are not within the common knowledge of lay jurors 
and have the potential to mislead jurors). 
The test for admissibility of scientific evidence is more 
restrictive than for expert evidence generally. The Utah Supreme 
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Court has made it clear that "regardless of how rule 702 phrases 
the general test for the admissibility of expert testimony, our 
case law superimposes a more restrictive test whenever scientific 
evidence is at issue." Rimmasch. 775 P. 2d at 397. That test is 
the inherent reliability requires announced in Phillips. Id. 
Evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in issue, and therefore, is inadmissible. Id. at 397-98. 
Moreover, a showing of the inherent reliability of the underlying 
principles or techniques must be made in each case in which 
similarly grounded evidence is offered. Id. at 398. 
In Phillips, 615 P. 2d at 123 0, the Utah Supreme Court outlined 
the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence noting 
first the paradigm case in the field, Frve v. United States, 293 F. 
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) . The Court, in quoting Frve, stated: 
scientific tests still in experimental stages should not 
be admitted in evidence, but that scientific testimony 
deduced from a 'well recognized scientific principle or 
discovery7 is admissible if the scientific principle from 
which the deduction is made is 'sufficiently established 
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field 
in which it belongs.' 
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1233 (quoting Frve, 293 F. at 1014).4 
4
 Under federal case law, the Frye test is no longer 
controlling. The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that 
the Frye test has been superseded by the adoption of the more 
liberal Federal Rules of Evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 
(1993) . The Court particularly relied on Rule 702 governing expert 
testimony explaining that " [n] othing in the text of this Rule [rule 
702] establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite 
to admissibility." Daubert, 509 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 2794, 
125 L.Ed.2d at 479-80. 
The argument that the adoption of Rule 702 superseded Utah's 
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The court went on to articulate a standard of admissibility 
termed "inherent reliability" which maintains the basic framework 
of the Frye standard: 
Tests that have passed from the experimental stage 
may be admissible if their reliability is reasonably 
demonstratable. An analysis of the admissibility of 
scientific evidence, while taking into account general 
scientific acceptance and widespread practical 
application, must focus in all events on proof of 
inherent reliability. 
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1234 (citations omitted). 
The admissibility of scientific evidence may be presented in 
two different ways: (1) a request that the trial court take 
judicial notice of the inherent reliability of the testimony's 
foundational principle; or (2) a request for an evidentiary hearing 
where evidence is presented in support or against the claim of 
inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398. In the first 
instance, judicial notice, the proponent must demonstrate "a very 
high level of reliability . . . " before a court may take judicial 
notice of the test's scientific reliability. Id; see, e.g., 
Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1348 (Utah 1987) (scientific 
scholars in relevant field unanimously agreed that HLA paternity 
test is reliable). 
test for the admissibility of scientific evidence has already been 
raised and settled in Utah. In Rimmasch, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that, in Utah, the test for admissibility of scientific 
evidence is more restrictive than is the test for expert evidence 
generally. The court made it clear that "regardless of how rule 
702 phrases the general test for the admissibility of expert 
testimony, our case law superimposes a more restrictive test 
whenever scientific evidence is at issue." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 
397. That test is the inherent reliability standard announced in 
Phillips. Id. 
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In the case now at bar the prosecution failed to satisfy 
either of the two methods of establishing a foundation for 
admissibility. First, after an pretrial evidentiary hearing, Judge 
Casey concluded that there was no basis for taking judicial notice. 
Tr. 35. Second, Officer Warner testified he did not know what the 
general opinion of the scientific community might be of the HGN 
test. Tr. 24. Judge Casey took as stipulated the fact that Warner 
was not familiar enough with scientific literature or studies to 
discuss them professionally. Tr. 15, 16 LL 10-11. Warner did 
testify to his own experience with the HGN test. When asked 
whether he had observed a correlation between the HGN test and a 
person's BAC, he stated that when all the cues he looks for in the 
HGN test are present, the person's BAC is .10 or higher. Tr. 21. 
Nevertheless, the judge found that Warner could not provide the 
expert testimony required for the Frve test foundation. Tr. 35. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING THE RESULTS OF THE HGN 
TEST WITHOUT REQUIRING THE CITY TO PRESENT EXPERT 
TESTIMONY REGARDING THE INHERENT RELIABILITY OF THE 
TEST 
The trial court erred by admitting the HGN test results 
without a foundation of inherent reliability. Under Utah law, the 
proponent of scientific evidence must make an initial foundational 
showing that convinces the trial court that the principles or 
techniques underlying the proffered testimony meet Phillips' 
standard of inherent reliability. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398. In 
addition, the trial court must make a separate determination that 
there is an adequate foundation for the proposed testimony, i.e., 
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that the scientific principles or techniques have been properly 
applied to the facts of the particular case by qualified persons 
and that the testimony is founded on that work. Id. at 3 98 n.7. 
At trial, Ms. Garcia suggested that, based on Rimmasch, the 
following foundational requirements would be required in regards to 
HGN testimony:5 
(1) that nystagmus of the eye is an inherently reliable 
indicator of an individual's blood alcohol level or ability to 
safely operate a motor vehicle; 
(2) that the 3-part HGN test performed by Warner is an 
inherently reliable means of measuring nystagumus of the eye, 
(3) that Warner properly performed the tests on this occasion, 
(4) that Warner was sufficiently qualified to testify as to 
the test's result. 
The prosecution failed to establish any such foundation. Each 
of the four factors is analyzed below. 
A. Nystagmus of the eye is not an inherently 
reliable indicator of blood alcohol level or 
ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. 
The city presented no expert testimony regarding the inherent 
reliability of the HGN test. The only evidence presented at trial 
to establish the reliability of the HGN came from arresting officer 
5
 Tr. 14. See also State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1111, 1117 
(Kan. 1992) (requiring initial foundation that: (1) nystagmus of 
the eye is, in fact, an indicator of alcohol consumption to the 
degree that it influences or impairs the ability to drive, (2) the 
method used to test HGN is a valid test to measure or perceive that 
phenomenon); see also Phillips v. Jackson, 615 P.2d 1228, 1235 
(Utah 1980) (enumerating elements required for foundation for the 
admissibility of paternity tests). 
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Warner. Most courts have determined that police officers do not 
have the specialized scientific training to testify about the HGN 
test's scientific reliability. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 334 
(Cal. 1994) (en banc) (court agreed with "the weight of authority" 
that police officer testimony is insufficient to establish general 
acceptance).6 
The California Court of Appeals explained the problem of 
allowing police officers with no scientific expertise to state 
their opinion regarding the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
and HGN: 
[HGN] rests on scientific premises well beyond [the 
officer's] knowledge, training, or education. Without 
some understanding of the processes by which alcohol 
ingestion produces nystagmus, how strong the correlation 
is, how other possible causes might be masked, what 
margin of error has been shown in statistical surveys, 
and a host of other relevant factors, his opinion on 
causation, notwithstanding his ability to recognize the 
symptom, was unfounded. 
Williams, 5 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court 
noted that "[t]he horizontal gaze nystagmus test is distinguished 
from other field sobriety tests in that science, rather than common 
knowledge, provides the legitimacy for horizontal gaze nystagmus 
6
 See, e.g., State v. Witte, 836 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Kan. 1992) 
(foundation of general acceptance in scientific community required 
in addition to qualifications of the officer administering the 
test); State v. Barker, 366 S.E.2d 642, 645 (W. Va. 1988) (error to 
admit HGN when only testimony was from arresting officer) ; State v. 
Borchardt, 395 N.W.2d 551, 559 (Neb. 1986) (arresting officer, who 
received training through police-sponsored seminar, not qualified 
to testify as expert witness to verify reliability of test); Yell 
v. State, 856 P.2d 996, 996-97 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (HGN is 
scientific evidence and requires proof that reliability has gained 
general acceptance; police officer's testimony falls far short of 
meeting standard). 
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testing." State v. Witte. 836 P.2d 1110, 1111, 1115 (Kan. 1992). 
In sum, police officers lack the scientific training and 
expertise necessary to validate the scientific principles upon 
which the HGN is premised. Although a police officer may testify 
as to his observations, those observations do not validate the 
underlying scientific principle. See Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1236 
(laboratory technician who completed basic workup on paternity 
blood tests not qualified to testify with respect to scientific 
validity of test). 
In the case now at bar, Officer Warner admitted that he has no 
personal knowledge of the biomechanical processes by which alcohol 
ingestion supposedly produces gaze nystagmus. Tr. 22-23. Warner 
has no degrees in medicine, opthamology, or neurology (medical 
fields familiar with neurological malfunction of smooth eye 
tracking patterns caused by alcohol or other neurological causes 
which may result in nystagmus). Tr. 23. Officer Warner also 
testified that he did not know what the general opinion of the 
scientific community might be of the HGN test. Tr. 24. The trial 
judge took as stipulated the fact that Warner was not familiar 
enough with scientific literature or studies to discuss them 
professionally. Tr. 15, 16 L 10-11. Judge Casey determined that 
Officer Warner was not qualified to establish the requirements for 
the admission of scientific evidence. Tr. 35. 
The prosecutor also suggested the judge could take judicial 
notice of the reliability of the HGN test on the basis of the 
underlying science. Tr. 34. The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
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that a "very high level of reliability is required before judicial 
notice can be taken." Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d at 398. After 
considering the evidence presented below Judge Casey concluded that 
there was no basis for taking judicial notice. Tr. 35. (emphasis 
added). Furthermore, any studies or cases presented on appeal are 
insufficient to allow the court to take judicial notice. See 
Phillips, 615 P.2d at 1236 (articles submitted by proponent of 
paternity test not sufficient, in absence of expert testimony, to 
determine as matter of law that paternity test has achieved general 
acceptance in scientific community). 
The HGN test has not achieved general acceptance in the 
scientific community. In State v. Witte, 836 P. 2d 1110 (Kan. 
1992), the Kansas Supreme Court found that "[t]he reliability of 
the HGN test is not currently a settled proposition in the 
scientific community." Witte, 836 P.2d at 1119 (emphasis added). 
The court added, " [o]ur research shows that the reaction within the 
scientific community is mixed." Id. (emphasis added). The court 
concluded that HGN did not meet the foundational requirements for 
admissibility of scientific evidence. Id. In addition, the court 
reviewed a number of scientific articles that question the 
scientific reliability of the HGN test and which recognize division 
within the scientific community regarding the reliability of the 
HGN test.7 See also Leahy, 882 P.2d at 335 (agreeing with Witte); 
7
 Those articles include Cowan & Jaffe, Proof and Disproof of 
Alcohol-Induced Driving Impairment Throucrh Evidence of Observable 
Intoxication and Coordination Testing, 9 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 
459 §12 (1990); Pangman, Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus: Voodoo 
Science, 2 DWI Journal 1, 3-4 (1987); Rouleau, Unreliability of 
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Cissne, 865 P.2d at 568 & n.5 
B. The 3-part HGN test performed by Warner is not 
an inherently reliable means of measuring 
nystagmus of the eye. 
The second foundational requirement is proof of the accuracy 
and reliability of the methods utilized in HGN testing. In 
administering the HGN test, Warner stated he held a pen 12-15 
inches in front of Ms. Garcia's eyes. He then moved the pen across 
Ms. Garcia's field of vision. Warner was looking for three things 
as he administered the test: (1) the angle of onset of nystagmus in 
each eye, (2) lack of smooth pursuit, and (3) the presence of 
nystagmus at maximum deviation, (i.e., when the eye is moved as far 
as possible to one side). Tr. 54-56. 
There are several indications that the test used by Officer 
Warner in this case is not inherently reliable. First, a 
fundamental part of the HGN test requires the officer to identify 
the angle of onset of nystagmus. The failure to use any device to 
measure the critical angles leads to inconsistent and inaccurate 
results. See 2 Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation § 26:01, at 4 
(1991) . When asked whether inaccurate estimation of the angles 
involved would lead to a false positive test result, Warner stated: 
"The test is no better than the person administering it." Tr. 26. 
Warner did not use a template or protractor to determine the angle 
of onset, he just estimated the angle. Tr. 26. He testified that 
Horizontal Gaze JNyst'agmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 439 § 
7, p. 452 (1989); 1 Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases §§ 8A:06, 
8A:08 (3d ed. 1992); 2 Nichols, Drinking/ Driving Litigation § 
26:01 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
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using any sort of device to measure the angle of onset was "not 
something that's ever been recommended for field work." Tr. 87. 
Moreover, there is disagreement among authorities as to what 
is the correct angle of onset. The Witte court reviewed several 
studies questioning the reliability of HGN testing: 
Other researchers disagree that 45 degrees is the 
appropriate angle of onset. According to one authority, 
50-60 percent of sober individuals who deviate their eyes 
more than 4 0 degrees to the side will exhibit nystagmus, 
and this nystagmus cannot be distinguished from alcohol 
gaze nystagmus. Another researcher suggests the 
threshold appearance of HGN in most individuals is 
observed at a 40-degree angle with a BAC reading of .06 
percent. Still another researcher contends individuals 
with a BAC reading of .10 do not exhibit nystagmus until 
the eye is deviated to a 51 degree angle. 
Witte, 836 P.2d at 1119 (internal citations omitted); see 2 
Nichols, Drinking/Driving Litigation § 26:01, at 3 (1991). 
A second problem with the field-administered HGN test is that 
apparently no device is used to keep the test subject's head still 
during the test. Warner testified that if the subject's head 
wasn't still the person administering the test could not validate 
the test. Tr. 27. Warner testified that Ms. Garcia did not keep 
her head still and that he did not use any sort of mechanical 
device to control her head movement, but that he kept doing the 
test until he was satisfied with the result. Tr. 27. The Witte 
court also noted concerns about estimating the angle of onset: 
The NHTSA agrees the angle of lateral deviation is 
critical. Despite the fact that the NHTSA obtained its 
research results through the use of mechanical devices 
that "hold the head in a stable position and precisely 
measure the angle of lateral deviation of the eye," the 
NHTSA instructs officers to estimate the 45-degree angle. 
A visual estimate of the angle would seem to cause 
inaccurate and inconsistent results. 
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Witte, 836 P. 2d at 1119-20 (internal citations omitted) . Head 
movement will affect the officer's estimation of angle of onset, 
thus affecting the result of the test. See Rouleau, Unreliability 
of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test, 4 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 
439 (1989). 
Third, NHTSA's definition of nystagmus can lead to confusion. 
The final manual produced by NHTSA to instruct law enforcement 
officials defines nystagmus as a jerking of the eyes. 1984 NHTSA 
Study, at 2. Given NHTSA's overly simplistic definition, a 
layperson could mistake the quick saccadic jerks that the eyeball 
makes while tracking a moving object, such as the object used by 
the examiner during the HGN test, for nystagmus. 2 Nichols, 
Drinking/Driving Litigation § 26:01, at 4, citing Rashbass, The 
Relationship Between Saccadic and Smooth Tracking Eye Movements, J. 
Physiology 159:326 (1961), and Robinson, Eye Movement Control in 
Primates, Science 161:1219 (1968). Another problem with 
identifying nystagmus is noted in the 1984 NHTSA Study where 
officers are instructed to "be sure that the jerkiness was not due 
to your moving the object in a jerky manner." 1984 NHTSA Study at 
4. 
Fourth, Warner acknowledged that nystagmus has other causes. 
He testified that nystagmus is caused by some illnesses and by 
substances other than alcohol and that some people in the 
population exhibit natural nystagmus. Tr. 24-25. He did not 
testify how he was able to distinguish alcohol nystagmus from other 
forms of nystagmus. 
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Various scientific studies describe other factors that may 
cause nystagmus. The Witte court noted research indicating that 
nystagmus indistinguishable from alcohol nystagmus can be caused by 
problems with inner ear labyrinth, influenza, streptococcus, 
vertigo, measles, syphilis, arteriosclerosis, muscular dystrophy, 
multiple sclerosis, hypertension, motion sickness, sunstroke, eye 
muscle fatigue, glaucoma, caffeine, nicotine, aspirin, poor 
lighting conditions, and an individual's circadian rhythms. Witte, 
836 P.2d at 1120 (internal citations omitted). 
In summary, the HGN test as administered in the field is 
fraught with fallibility. According to the Warner's testimony, the 
tester never uses any device to measure angles that are critical to 
the test result. Moreover, there is significant dispute as to what 
exactly are the critical angles and as to how to interpret the 
results. In addition, no device is used to hold the tested 
person's head still, which exacerbates the problem of determining 
angles. Finally, there are several other causes of nystagmus --
indistinguishable by the roadside HGN test -- that affect the 
accuracy of the test. The field-administered HGN test is simply 
not an inherently accurate method of measuring gaze nystagmus. 
C. The HGN test performed in this case was not 
performed in accordance with proper procedures 
nor equipment. 
Warner did not use satisfactory procedures and equipment when 
performing the HGN test in this case. Even if he followed the 
procedures for conducting roadside HGN tests that he was taught at 
police-school, the results would not be inherently reliable. See 
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II. B. supra. First, he did not use any device to keep the 
subject's head still. Warner testified that if the subject's head 
wasn't still the person administering the test could not validate 
the test. Tr. 27. Warner testified that Ms. Garcia did not keep 
her head still and that he did not use any sort of mechanical 
device to control her head movement. Tr. 27. Because 
determination of the angle of onset is such a sensitive 
measurement, the failure to use a device to anchor the head raises 
concerns about the accuracy of the test. 
Second, Warner did not use any device to measure the critical 
angles. Warner stated that he did not use a template or protractor 
to determine the angle of onset, he just estimated the angle. Tr. 
26. Whatever validity the HGN test may have can be destroyed if 
proper conditions and procedures are not established.8 Warner's 
failure to use a head restraint combined with his failure to use a 
protractor or other device to accurately record the angle of onset 
exacerbated the deficiencies of the HGN test in this case. 
D. Warner's experience in administering the HGN 
test is insufficient foundation. 
Warner stated he was first trained to do the HGN test in 1988 
as part of an intoxilyzer certification course and has used it as 
8
 Kofford v. Flora, 744 P.2d 1343, 1354 (Utah 1987) (stating 
that " [t]he validity of HLA tests can be destroyed if proper 
conditions and procedures are not established."). Compare the 
elaborate 15-step testing protocol established for HLA testing and 
note the court's holding that "before HLA test results can be 
admitted in a paternity trial, evidence must be produced that the 
particular tests relied upon in the case were conducted as 
specified by the Standards or in an equally reliable manner[.]" 
Id. at 1354-56. 
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much as 250 times per year since that time. Tr. 20-21. Warner 
testified that he could not say whether the Salt Lake Police 
Department has used the test continuously since that time. Tr. 20. 
Warner's apparent experience in administering the HGN is 
meaningless without a reliable test properly performed. Judge 
Casey found that Officer Warner was unable to establish a 
foundation as to the reliability of the principles underlying the 
HGN test. Moreover, the substantial problems affecting the 
reliability of HGN field-testing procedures generally and the 
serious flaws with the way the test was performed in this case make 
the test results even more suspect. Therefore, because the 
necessary foundation for the admission of HGN tests was not met in 
this case, Ms. Garcia asks this court to remand this case for a new 
trial. 
III. THE ADMISSION OF THE HGN RESULTS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
REQUIRING REMAND. 
The lower court committed reversible error when it allowed the 
admission of HGN evidence without a foundation as to the inherent 
reliability of the principles and procedures underlying the test. 
See State v. Rimmasch, 775 P. 2d 388 (Utah 1989) (reversing and 
remanding based on erroneous admission of sexual abuse profile 
evidence without foundation of reliability); Phillips v. Jackson, 
615 P. 2d 1228 (Utah 1980) (reversing and remanding based on lack of 
foundation for human leucocyte antigen testing); People v. Leahy, 
882 P. 2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) (affirming reversal of 
defendant's conviction and remanding for Frye-type hearing as to 
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whether HGN testing is generally accepted as reliable); State v. 
Witte. 836 P. 2d 1110 (Kan. 1992) (holding that admission of HGN 
test result was prejudicial error and remanding for new trial) . 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that in order for an error to 
constitute reversible error, the error must be sufficiently 
prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result for the defendant in its absence. See State v. 
Young, 853 P.2d 327, 361 (Utah 1993). 
To prove the elements of Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol (DUI) the prosecution had to establish either that Ms. 
Garcia was driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle while 
having a blood alcohol level of .08 or greater; or that she was 
under the influence of alcohol to the degree that she was incapable 
of safely driving a motor vehicle. Salt Lake Code § 12.24.100. 
The error of admitting HGN evidence was prejudicial in this case 
because Warner's HGN testimony was the only evidence presented that 
Ms. Garcia's blood alcohol level was over the legal limit of .08. 
The evidence introduced against Ms. Garcia at trial can be 
marshalled into four general categories: (1) Driving pattern 
evidence, (2) Initial observations, (3) Field sobriety tests, (4) 
Breath test evidence. A review of this evidence shows that, in the 
absence of the HGN test, it is reasonably likely a jury would have 
found Ms. Garcia not guilty of DUI. 
A. Ms. Garcia's driving pattern indicates that 
she was capable of driving safely. 
Ms. Garcia did not commit any moving violations. On March 5, 
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1994 at about 8:25 p.m., Officer David Warner (Warner) observed a 
car driven by Carol Garcia heading westbound on 5th South and then 
turning southbound on State Street. Warner followed the car until 
it stopped at a light at 6th South and there told Ms. Garcia to 
pull over. Ms. Garcia pulled over and stopped between 6th and 7th 
South. Tr. 45-46. Warner testified he saw no driving violations 
by Ms. Garcia, i.e., no wide turns, no weaving, no straddling lane 
lines, no following too closely, no drifting in her lane, not slow 
to respond to traffic signals. Tr. 69-73.9 
Driving pattern evidence is critical in this case because 
there was no breath test showing whether Ms. Garcia was over or 
under the legal limit of .08. Where a driver is over .08 no 
driving pattern evidence is necessary; the driver has committed a 
per se violation of the DUI law. However, where as here, there is 
no breath test, the prosecution must prove that the driver is 
incapable of driving safely. In such cases, driving pattern 
evidence is extremely significant. If Ms. Garcia were in fact 
incapable of driving safely, it is likely she would have committed 
some driving error. Since she committed no driving error, in the 
absence of the HGN testimony that she had a blood alcohol level of 
.10 or higher, it is reasonably likely the jury would have found 
her not guilty of DUI. 
9
 Warner stated that he stopped the car because he observed 
two teenagers sitting on the sunroof of the car with their legs 
inside the car. Tr. 45. Based on that observation Ms. Garcia was 
initially charged with a seatbelt violation; however, that charge 
was dismissed at the request of the city prosecutor before trial. 
Tr. 1. 
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B. Warner's initial observations are inconclusive at most. 
Warner intially noted that Ms. Garcia was pleasant and upbeat; 
and he stated that she had normal (not slurred) speech. Tr. 49. 
Warner also noted that Ms. Garcia had red eyes but admitted that 
there are many causes of red eyes including allergy, fatigue, smoke 
and pollution. Tr. 75. 
Warner noted an odor of alcohol. Tr. 48. Ms. Garcia admitted 
drinking two beers earlier at a barbecue. Tr. 49. Officer Williams 
later found an open can of beer under Ms. Garcia's seat. Tr. 99. 
Warner admitted that an odor of alcohol is not proof of impairment 
and that even sober individuals who have just taken a drink can 
have an odor of alcohol on their breath. Tr. 73-74. In addition, 
the judge gave the jury an instruction that the mere consumption of 
alcohol is not unlawful. See jury instructions. 
At some point during the traffic stop, Officer Roger Williams 
(Williams) arrived on the scene. Williams stated Ms. Garcia had 
bloodshot eyes and that he noted an odor of alcohol. Williams did 
not recall observing any particular field sobriety tests performed 
by Warner; he stated that he thought there was one test she could 
not do but did not remember which one it was. Tr. 97. 
C. Field sobriety tests, (excluding the HGN 
test) , do not show Ms. Garcia either had a BAC 
over .08 or was incapable of safely driving. 
The first field sobriety test (FST) given Ms. Garcia was the 
HGN test. Warner testified that based on his experience the HGN 
test indicated that Ms. Garcia had a blood alcohol level of .10 or 
higher. Tr. 56; see also Tr. 21, 28. Thus, the HGN evidence could 
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have been sufficient in itself for the jury to find Ms. Garcia 
guilty as charged. 
The next test given was the "Walk and Turn" test. Tr. 59. 
Ms. Garcia was asked to walk nine steps in a line, heel to toe, 
with her hands at her sides, to watch her feet while walking and 
count each step out loud, then to rotate and wake nine more steps 
heel to toe back. Tr. 60. Ms. Garcia complained of an ankle 
injury but attempted to complete the test as asked. Tr. 76. 
During the "instructional stage" the individual is asked to stand 
heel to toe. Warner stated that if they have a problem, i.e., if 
they lose balance a total of three times, this test is terminated. 
Tr. 59. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia stepped to the side only one 
time during the instructional phase. Tr. 59. Ms. Garcia correctly 
walked nine steps, stayed on a straight line, did not start too 
soon or stop to steady herself, was able to complete the nine steps 
without using her arms to balance, and touched heel to toe on all 
but the 6th step. Tr. 76-80. Then she paused, turned and asked 
Warner to clarify the test directions. Tr. 80. Warner failed Ms. 
Garcia for not completing the test. Tr. 80. 
Warner then asked Ms. Garcia to perform the "finger count" 
test. Tr. 61. Warner provides subjects the following 
instructions: to touch the tip of each finger with their thumb, 
counting that finger out loud; to start with their little finger up 
to their index finger and back down, counting: one, two, three, 
four, four, three, two, one; and to complete this cycle three 
times. Warner stated he looks for actual touching of fingers and 
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correct counting. Tr. 62-63. Ms. Garcia correctly touched her 
fingers tip to tip and performed the test the correct number of 
times. Tr. 80. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia also counted 
correctly the first two times she did the test (1234, 4321), but 
counted 1234, 4231 the third time. Warner admitted that other than 
that she performed the test correctly. Tr. 82. He cautiously 
admitted that "I wouldn't describe her performance on that test as 
poor." Tr. 83. 
Finally, Warner asked Ms. Garcia to perform the Rhomberg or 
"head tilt and count" test. Tr. 63. This test required Ms. Garcia 
to put her feet together and her arms down at her side, to close 
her eyes and tilt her head back, and estimate the passage of 3 0 
seconds. Tr. 63. Warner stated that Ms. Garcia swayed from side 
to side (but apparently did not lose her balance) , and that she 
stayed in this unnatural and uncomfortable posture for only nine 
seconds. Tr. 63. 
D. No breath test indicating Ms. Garcia's BAC was obtained. 
After the last field sobriety test, Warner placed Ms. Garcia 
under arrest and asked her to submit to a chemical test. Tr. 84-
85. Warner testified that when asked to submit to the test Ms. 
Garcia stated: "Another one? No I won't take another one." Tr. 
85.10 And when informed of the consequences of refusing the test 
10
 Sometime during her field sobriety tests, Officer Williams 
performed a portable breath test on Ms. Garcia. Tr. 89. He 
testified that it showed that Ms. Garcia had consumed some alcohol. 
Tr. 89-90. Judge Casey instructed the jury that the mere 
consumption of alcohol prior to driving is not unlawful. See jury 
instructions. The actual test result was not admitted into 
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(license suspension) Ms. Garcia responded: "What's the point. My 
license is suspended anyway." Tr. 90. 
Prosecutors sometimes argue that refusal to take as many tests 
as the police may request is evidence of guilt. In this case the 
prosecutor argued that Ms. Garcia could have proved herself 
innocent by taking another breath test. Tr. 116-17. Garcia's 
refusal was understandable under the circumstances, however. Not 
only had she already taken one breath test, she knew that her 
license was already suspended. Thus, evidence of her refusal to 
take the second test in this case is not particularly probative. 
E. Summary of the evidence 
Warner's HGN testimony was the only direct evidence that Ms. 
Garcia had violated the city's DUI code. Warner testified that the 
HGN test showed a BAC of .10 or higher, well over the legal limit 
of .08. That testimony was perhaps determinative. In the absence 
of the HGN testimony, the city would have had to prove Ms. Garcia 
was incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. See Salt Lake 
evidence because the portable breath test has not been recognized 
as reliable and accurate. Tr. 84. The Utah Code provides that 
"the Department of Public Safety shall establish standards for the 
administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a 
person's breath...." Utah Code Ann. § 44-6-44.3(1). The 
Department of Public Safety complied and made a rule that "all 
breath testing instruments ...to be used for evidentiary purposes 
must be certified by brand and/or model by the DPS [Department of 
Public Safety]." Utah Admin. Code R14-500-5(A). The DPS has not 
certified the hand-held machine used by police officers to do 
breath tests in the field. 
The test was only admitted at all to explain testimony the 
defense elicited on cross-examination that, when asked to take the 
breath test, Ms. Garcia answered "Another test. No, I won't take 
another test." Tr. 85, 89-90. 
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Code 12.24.100. The only evidence presented about Ms. Garcia's 
ability to operate her vehicle was that she did so correctly. 
Warner noted no moving violations whatsoever. Because there was no 
evidence of any moving violations, it would be very difficult 
(absent the HGN test) for the jury to find Ms. Garcia incapable of 
safely operating her vehicle. 
Moreover, the results of the other field sobriety tests are 
not particularly compelling. Ms. Garcia's small deviations from 
difficult and unnatural tests are not particularly compelling proof 
of DUI. Similarly, evidence of Ms. Garcia's refusal to take a 
second breath test are understandable given she had already taken 
one test and given that she was aware that her license was already 
suspended. Thus, without the HGN testimony that Ms. Garcia had a 
BAC of .10 or higher, it is reasonably likely the jury would have 
found her not guilty. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND WRITTEN OPINION 
No Utah appellate court has yet addressed the issue of whether 
HGN evidence is scientific evidence.11 The issue is frequently 
raised in Utah trial courts, however, and is dealt with 
inconsistently.12 In order to assure that Utah's DUI law is 
11
 See State v. Strausbercr, Case No. 940241-CA, slip. op. at 
5, n.3 (Utah App. May 4, 1995) (noting "We do not reach the 
question of whether or not the trial court erred by admitting the 
HGN evidence."). 
12
 The Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) alone handled 
578 DUI cases in Salt Lake County in 1994. An informal survey of 
the attorneys in the misdemeanor division of the LDA indicates that 
the judges in the Third Circuit are fairly evenly divided as to 
whether they allow HGN evidence as evidence of DUI. 
37 
applied equally and fairly to all defendants, Ms. Garcia urges this 
court to resolve the issue with a written opinion on this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Garcia asks the court to find 
that: (1) the HGN test is scientific evidence subject to a 
preliminary determination by the trial court as to whether the 
evidence meets Utah's inherent reliability test, (2) the trial 
court erred by allowing the arresting officer to testify as to the 
HGN test and its results without a prior foundation of the inherent 
reliability of the test and the principles underlying the test, (3) 
the arresting officer was not qualified to validate the scientific 
principles supporting the relationship between alcohol ingestion 
and nystagmus, and (4) the admission of the HGN test results in 
this case without the proper foundation was error requiring remand 
for a new trial. 
DATED this so1 day of August, 19 95. 
R A L ^ DtftLAPTANA 
A t t o r n e y f o r A p p e l l a n t 
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